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Unwinding the Winding Trajectory
The Divergence between National Accounts and State Planning,
Argentina 1937–1948
Cecilia T. LANATA BRIONES* & Hernán GONZÁLEZ BOLLO**
Abstract.Using primary sources from different ofþcial agencies, this paper reconstructs
the initial trajectory of Argentine national accounting and sheds light on its divergent
path with regards to the state planning carried out by the Peronist administration. Based
on the notions of the sociology of quantiþcation framework, it argues that the diver-
gence was grounded on biases, technical arguments and political support that suggest
different conceptions about the Argentine economy and society. This article claims that
from the mid-1930s and throughout 1940 two groups of experts were formed within the
Argentine state that had responsibilities in the design and implementation of economic
programmes and policies. Each group had its own vision of the national economy, based
on their speciþc use of statistics.
Keywords. national accounts, state planning, Argentina
Résumé. Les premiers pas de la comptabilité nationale et de la planiÿcation en
Argentine (1937-1948). Retour sur deux trajectoires divergentes. Par le croisement de
plusieurs fonds d’archives publiques, cet article examine les premiers pas de la comp-
tabilité nationale en Argentine. Il met en lumière le chemin divergent emprunté par la
planiþcation mise en œuvre par l’administration péroniste. Dans une perspective de
sociologie de la quantiþcation, l’article montre que cette divergence est le produit de juge-
ments, d’arguments d’ordre technique et d’appuis politiques qui révèlent des conceptions
différentes de l’économie et de la société argentines. Il analyse ainsi l’émergence, entre
le milieu des années 1930 et les années 1940, de deux groupes d’experts, en charge de
la conception et la mise en œuvre des programmes et des politiques économiques, avec
chacun sa propre vision de l'économie nationale, et son propre usage des statistiques.
Mots-clés. Comptabilité nationale, planiþcation, Argentine
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In October 1946, President Juan Domingo Perón and the technical
secretary of the Presidency José Francisco Figuerola presented to the National
Congress the First Five-Year Plan, which was in place between 1947 and 1951.
Argentina was entering the era of major national programmes and state plan-
ning.With it, the Peronist administration centralized funding in the executive
branch of the government. The underlying aim of the plan was to carry out an
ambitious programme of investment in infrastructure and modernization of
the state.1 However, in the design and development of the Five-Year Plan the
Peronist planners did not make use of the national accounting techniques nor
did they rely on the corresponding existing data that was already available to
them and which was elaborated by the economists of theMinistry of Finance
and the Argentine Central Bank.
National accounting or national accounts are a methodical and synthetic
procedure to quantify data by recording themonetary ÿows between productive
activities both private and public that comprise the national economy.What is now
called gross domestic product is the most renowned outcome generated by this
system of interrelated accounts.2 This quantiþcation is generally carried out on
an annual and/or quarterly basis by national statistical agencies. These accounts
provide information to design and support economic and social policies as well
as plans and programmes. In the 1940s, the most renowned outcome of this
quantiþcation procedurewas denominated national income, due to the pioneering
works of Simon Kuznets for the United States, released in 1938, and Richard
Stone and JamesMeade for Great Britain, published in 1941.3 The development
of national accounts and the corresponding estimation of national income is one
of the greatest achievements of public statistics in the mid-twentieth century
despite being currently questioned regarding its capacity to capture what really
matters about the economy and its agents.4National statistical systems, deþned
as the articulation of human resources, technical language, methodologies and
tools that produce, distribute and use numerical information,5 are formed by
a network of specialized ofþces capable of collecting and producing primary
data. At their origins, these estimations were generated by compiling several
sources of information. This included income tax returns, industrial and agri-
cultural census þgures, the amount paid on wages and salaries, the numbers
on investment in capital goods and corporate proþts, and the periodic surveys
on income and expenditure of working-class families.6
The development of national accounts in Argentina was prior to the First
Five-Year Peronist Plan. The foremost calculation of the national income was
1. PRESIDENCIA DE LA NACIÓN, 1946.
2. D. COYLE, 2014.
3. M. PERLMAN, 1987, p. 133–151.
4. N. G.MANKIW, 2016, p. 356.
5. P. STARR, 1987, p. 8.
6. A. DESROSIÈRES, 2004, p. 339–342; 361–362.
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carried out by the Ministry of Finance solely for the year 1941. The second
estimate covered the period 1935–1945, using 1935 as the base year. It was
generated by the Ofþce of Economic Research (Oþcina de Investigaciones
Económicas, OIE).7 Today it is known that these two estimates were produced
by the same team of statisticians and economists. Julio C. Alizón García,
Manuel Balboa, Carlos B. Brignone, Loreto Domínguez, Alberto Fracchia and
Julio C. González del Solar were the most renowned individuals behind these
calculations. They specialized in the quantiþcation and weighting of the large
aggregates of the Argentine economy.8 These individuals were based at the
OIE of the Argentine Central Bank, which was later elevated to Department
of Economic Research (Departamento de Investigaciones Económicas,
DIE) and þnally renamed Department of Economic and Statistical Situation
(Departamento de Situación Económica y Estadística).
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the initial trajectory of Argentine
national accounting and shed light on its divergent path with regard to the
state planning carried out by the Peronist administration, which lasted
between 1946 and 1955. The divergence was grounded on biases, technical
arguments and political support that suggest different conceptions about
Argentine economy and society. This article argues that from the mid-1930s
and throughout 1940 within the Argentine state two types of experts were
formed that had responsibilities in the design and implementation of eco-
nomic programmes and policies. Each group had its own vision of the national
economy based on its speciþc use of statistics. On the one hand, a closed and
stable team of government economists within the OIE-DIE of the Argentine
Central Bank was forged. The creative ability of this group paved the way
for updated estimates of national income. On the other hand, a group of civil
servants with substantial experience on regulating the economy was created.
The latter group, which would develop close ties to Perón from 1943, was
responsible for the First Five-Year Plan that was designed without using the
interpretative matrix of national accounting. To perform this analysis, there
is an interweaving of the cultural history of ofþcial numbers and Peronist
planning with a micro-history of government economists.9 This examination
is also based on the notions of the sociology of quantiþcation framework,
which argues that statistics develop together with public and private efforts
to organize and control society. Sociology of quantiþcation is conceived as
a ‘theoretical-cum-practical pursuit’,10 where scientiþc, administrative and
political aspects are closely related.
7. R.MENTZ, 1991, p. 525–526.
8. Inter-American Statistical Institute, 1955, p. 13–17.
9. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014–2015, p. 119–124; F. NEIBURG & M. PLOTKIN, 2004,
p. 231–263; E. ELENA, 2005, p. 81–108.
10. J.-G. PRÉVOST & J.-P. BEAUD, 2012, p. 6.
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Aþrst clue to the existence of two opposing positions within the Argentine
state and the divergent paths between the national accounts and the First Five-
Year Plan is the trajectory of the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch. Prebisch
was the general manager of the Argentine Central Bank between 1935 and
1943 as well as the intellectual mentor of the OIE’s research. After the coup
d’état of June 1943, which was the prologue to the Peronist administration,
the military government þred him from the Central Bank and denied him
permission to teach at the Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of
Buenos Aires. In the midst of the cold and distant treatment he received from
Argentine diplomacy, in 1949 Prebisch presented in Havana the Structuralist
Manifesto of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), El desarrollo económico de América Latina y sus principales
problemas. Just like the military and the Peronist governments did, that
proclamation called into question the doctrine of comparative advantages of
international trade. However, it did not praise the economic autarchy advocated
by the military government and the Peronist administration.11
The development of national accounts and the planning initiative were
two innovations that occurred in industrialized countries in the years between
the Great Depression and World War II. Both events drastically reconþ-
gured the trade ÿows of the Atlantic Ocean.12 In Argentina, the decline of
international prices coupled with the closure of the international markets
for beef, wool, cereals and oilseeds produced in the fertile Pampas triggered
public intervention mechanisms, such as price-setting schemes and regu-
latory boards. The composition of agricultural production changed. While
the Pampas turned once again towards cattle activity and forage crops, the
agricultural output from outside the Pampa region increased, all due to the
increasing domestic demand.13 In the þrst half of the 1930s, the government
strengthened the foreign exchange currency control while Congress sanctioned
national budgets that included a vast plan of public works. Manufacturing
activity became the largest generator of urban employment. Together with
construction and the regional economies, these sectors boosted a national
economy where the domestic market’s growth rate was independent of the
declining physical volume of exports.
Starting in the 1930s, the Argentine economy and the transformed
social-labour agents gave life to an intervening state that dictated its regula-
tions fromministries, ofþcial banks and public companies. Those responsible
for these activities were labour lawyers, agronomists, architects, accoun-
tants, engineers and economists. In particular, the individuals placed in the
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank highlighted the advantages of
national accounts, whose novel language allowed for þnancial management
11. J. LOVE, 1996, p. 391–401; E. J. DOSMAN, 2010, p. 197–257.
12. A. O’CONNELL, 1984, p. 479–504.
13. J. FODOR, 1975, p. 152–155.
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and the allocation of þscal resources amid the scarcity generated by the
end of the Second World War and as a consequence of the post-war uncer-
tainty.14 This was not a unique trend. In each country, the development of
domestic national income estimates, in addition to the adoption and use of
macroeconomic terminology, was an isolated and artisanal task that occur-
red either in a ministry, a secretariat or the Central Bank. The adaptation of
these statistical innovations using standardized and comparable methodo-
logies between countries did not occur until 1953. It was an initiative of the
Statistics Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs.15 Among the Latin American participants of the training seminar
in the accounting of income and the national product were Manuel Balboa
and Alberto Fracchia, representing the Argentine Secretariat of Economic
Affairs of the Presidency.16
This article analyses the administrative capacities of the Argentine
state, focusing on the knowledge of the economy and its agents during a
special period. In particular, it seeks to explain the dissociation between
the generation of national accounts and the implementation of the First
Five-Year Plan. To carry out this task, it uses a selection of ofþcial primary
sources produced throughout the 1930s and 1940s by the Presidency, several
ministries (Agriculture,War, Treasury, Public Instruction, Interior, and Public
Works) and the Argentine Central Bank. Three speciþc issues are examined
in this paper after this introduction. The second section studies the ofþcial
development of Argentine national accounts together with the (decreasing)
inÿuence that the members of the OIE-DIE of the Argentine Central Bank
had on economic policy. The third section reconstructs the formation of a
group of government experts, headed by José Francisco Figuerola and with
close ties to Perón, by focusing on their ideas, networks and the quantitative
sources they developed. The last section concludes.
1. The Winding Beginning of Argentine National Accounts
The OIE was established in 1928 within the Argentine National Bank
(Banco de la Nación Argentina). In 1935, with the creation of the Argentine
Central Bank, the entire team of economists moved to an entity that enjoyed an
autarkic legal regime, under the protection of the bank’s General Management
Division headed by Raúl Prebisch. This move boosted the OIE’s administra-
tive autonomy, its intellectual creativity and its gravitating position within
the network of powerful ofþces of the decentralized Argentine statistical
14. M. PERLMAN, 1987, p. 133–151; J. A. TOOZE, 2001; A. DESROSIÈRES, 2013.
15. United Nations, series F, no. 2, 1953.
16. Gobierno de Chile, 1953, p. 8; 14.
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system.17 A series of cognitive achievements regarding the characteristics
of the national economy and its agents provided the basis for an estimate of
the 1941 national income, which was released in 1944. This novel and still
rudimentary scheme of economic knowledge generated the tools to fully
comprehend and exercise the management of a range of instruments of what
nowadays is understood as economic policy: tariffs, exchange rates, taxes,
currency and public investment. In a context of political change triggered
by the military coup of June 1943, there were dissimilar publicly voiced
reactions to this new statistical tool, which inÿuenced the perception diffe-
rent sectors had of the estimate and its (lack of) use as the basis of the First
Five-Year Plan.
The OIE was formed by three administrative divisions: Foreign Trade,
Industry and Economy, plus the Statistical Section. The latter was the head-
quarters of punchcard machines that compiled, tabulated and classiþed
information. The OIE members were mostly accountants and economists
who had graduated from the University of Buenos Aires and the National
University of the Litoral. To get a placement within the OIE, the candidate had
to pass an oral examination before a tribunal in which he or she had to solve
a speciþc economic policy problem.18 The number of permanent OIE staff
rose from 11 members in 1928 to 120 in 1941. Among its most outstanding
government economists was Julio E. Alizón García. Before joining the Ofþce
Alizón García had a position within the statistical ofþce of the province of
Santa Fe. Between 1938 and 1946 he was responsible for the OIE’s area of
statistics and economic censuses.19 Some members of the OIE were granted
a postgraduate scholarship funded by the Argentine Central Bank to pursue
their studies at Harvard University. Julio C. González del Solar, a specialist
in monetary banking economics, and Carlos S. Brignone, an expert on living
standards, wages and prices, obtained theirMaster in Public Administration at
Harvard. Under the same agreement, LoretoM. Domínguez obtained aMaster
in Business Administration and wrote a chapter on national income in Latin
17. From its origins until the 1940s, the Argentine national statistical system was an
archipelago of ofþces which had a de facto, horizontal and decentralized coordination in
ministries, secretariats, banks and public þrms. Together with the OIE, the most important
agencies included the General Bureau of Statistics (Dirección General de Estadística de la
Nación) placed within the Ministry of Finance, the Rural Economy and Statistics Bureau
(Dirección de Economía Rural y Estadística) within the Ministry of Agriculture, and the
Statistics Division of the National Labour Department (División Estadística del Departamento
Nacional del Trabajo) within the Interior Ministry, H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014a, p. 19.
18. R. PREBISCH, 1972.
19. Julio E. Alizón García graduated as an economist from the National University of
the Litoral. Between 1933 and 1938 he was head of the Statistical Ofþce of the province of
Santa Fe. He was the provincial delegate for the industrial census of 1935 and the mortgage
census of 1936, Inter-American Statistical Institute, 1949, p. 9.
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America for a book edited by the National Bureau of Economic Research.20
This training provided them with the knowledge needed to adopt and adapt
international statistical developments to the Argentine situation.21
From its origins, the OIE trained analysts on the volatility of the phy-
sical quantities and values of Argentine exports and imports. Some of them
were in charge of the design of the wholesale price index, published monthly
in the OIE’s ÿagship journal Económica. Others became organizers of two
key state institutions: the Ofþce of Exchange Control (Oþcina de Control de
Cambios) and the General Directorate of Revenues (Dirección General de
Rentas).22 As time passed by, these individuals also became meticulous fol-
lowers and inspectors of the transformations of the national economy, as they
contributed to the design of questions and the revision of the responses of the
national census of industry and construction in 1935, of mortgages in 1936
and of agriculture in 1937. This trajectory was favoured by the agreement
established between the OIE and the General Bureau of Statistics (Dirección
General de Estadística de la Nación, DGEN), located within theMinistry of
Finance. That agreement implied an association between the two statistical
agencies and the division of statistical tasks by which the DGEN produced
and compiled the primary data on foreign trade, demography and industry.
By then, the DGEN had a stable staff of around 180 employees, who had
extensive experience in the mechanized processing of data, thanks to their
management of punchcard machines. The Ministry of Finance approved the
collaboration of OIE economists in the tasks of the DGEN on the grounds
of ‘convenience’.23 The ongoing organization of a large team with increasing
expertise in the quantiþcation of economic data laid the foundations of a virtual
centralization of methods, rather than an actual administrative centralization
within the existing decentralized Argentine statistical system.
On the basis of the information collected by the industrial and construc-
tion census of 1935, as part of their statistical association the OIE together
with the DGEN generated an updated list of establishments from which it
started to collect statistical information every two years. The Ministry of
Finance wanted to distribute information through mimeographed reports on
the degree of development of domestic economic activities. Its þnal aim was
to provide incentives as well as to guide the plans and programmes of banks,
industry and commercial þrms. The inaugural activity of the associated OIE-
DGEN was the collection and publication of the 1937 statistics. It gathered
64,330 questionnaires from registered establishments. In total, 74% of those
20. Inter-American Statistical Institute, 1949, p. 10; 13–14; L. DOMÍNGUEZ, 1947,
p. 166–244.
21. As had happened years before with the men behind the Argentine cost of living
index; see C. T. LANATA BRIONES, 2016, p. 137; 188.
22. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014a, p. 158; 167–168.
23. REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 1942a, p. 317–318, authors’ translation.
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responses were considered satisfactory and useful for analysis.24 The publica-
tion’s þnal edition included a chart with the main goods produced, indicating
class, quantity and value according to the classiþcation adopted by foreign
trade statistics. It was accompanied by a brief formula that showedwhich items
were being covered by domestic production, before the concept of ‘import
substitution industrialization’ was employed ofþcially. Consequently, the
report argued that ‘in this way, when consulting the import or export þgures
of a particular article the reader will at the same time know the data of its
domestic production since he/she can easily þnd the corresponding þgures’.25
To establish the 1939 construction and manufacturing statistics, 70,464
questionnaires from registered establishments were collected. A total of 73.8%
of those forms were used for analysis.26 The homogeneity of the questions
and responses between 1937 and 1939 made it possible to generate the strate-
gic calculation of the added value of the secondary sector. This opened the
possibility of linking the income generated by all the productive activities
involved within the sector. The sum of the values spent on salaries, wages,
insurance, leases, taxes and depreciation allowed for the appreciation of ‘the
economic importance of industry with a degree of approximation greater than
the other attributes enquired by these statistics considered individually’.27
In turn, the statistics of 1941 prioritized establishments with more than
þve workers. This narrowing down of the sample generated an increase in the
share of useful questionnaires to 85.3% of the 73,645 initially distributed. In
the middle of the semi-autarkic conditions imposed in the transatlantic trade
by submarine war, the rise of the indicators of 1941 in relation to 1939 was
remarkable. Manufacturing value added increased by 13.4% and the amount
paid in the form of wages and salaries rose by 14.4%, while the number of
manufacturing products increased by 23.7% and the amount of rawmaterials
used jumped by 28.5%.28 The memoir from the Argentine Central Bank was
full of optimism, stating that ‘if the industrial effort meets most of our needs,
it is due to the organic growth of the productive means’, with establishments
operating under full productive capacity and the existence of successive work
shifts of the labour force.29 In parallel, the Ministry of Finance established
a commission to study a new valuation tax through a complete review of
the classiþcation of goods that entered the country and the determination
of import duties.
24. REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 1940, p. 7, 15.
25. Ibid., p. 303, authors’ translation.
26. Id., 1941a, p. 189–196.
27. Id., 1942b, p. 14, authors’ translation.
28. Id., 1944, p. 20.
29. BANCO CENTRAL DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA (BCRA), 1943, p. III-2; III-3, aut hor s’
translation.
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Moreover, under their division of statistical task agreement, the OIE
and the DGEN began to calculate the income of manufacturing, extractive
industries and construction companies. To this end, the National Income
Division (División Renta Nacional) of the OIE was created, which included
experienced personnel from other divisions. It was led by Loreto Domínguez
between 1937 and 1944. He was accompanied by Manuel Balboa, who for-
med part of it between 1941 and 1949. Alberto Fracchia was also a member
of the division between 1946 and 1949. The division’s aim was to determine
the value created by economic activities for the 1941 calendar year using the
value added method. This procedure summed up the values added by the
sectors of production (agriculture, livestock, industry, mining, hunting and
þshing), distribution (communication, transport, wholesale and retail trade)
and services (government, þnance and professional activities). A decade of
income tax returns offered a statistically usable by-product from the ‘factors of
production’ perspective.30Calculations, coefþcients, deductions and tabulations
were developed and estimated from the þnancial reports of municipalities,
provinces, ministries and agencies that regulated and planned rural activities.
The Estimate of the National Income for the Year 1941 (Estimación de la
renta nacional correspondiente al año 1941) published in 1944 arrived at
a gross þgure of $10,788 million pesos.31 This was a practical result and a
starting point for adapting the information available in Argentina, adopting
the methodology developed by Simon Kuznets for the National Bureau of
Economic Research and by James Meade and Richard Stone for the Central
Statistical Ofþce. The estimate for 1941 was an addition to the existing þgures
of public þnances, such as the reserves of the Argentine Central Bank and
the national budget.32
Despite the productive vigour that the estimate aimed to reÿect, its
recognition and acknowledgement varied between sectors, contributing to
its being undermined. The euphoria was territory of those economists who
favoured industrialization. This was still a minority group within Argentine
society at that time. One of them was Emilio Llorens, a member of the
Review of Argentine Economics (Revista de Economía Argentina). Llorens
encouraged the thesis favouring the protectionism of the Romanian engineer
Mihaïl Manoilescu, in which the latter claimed that the proportional increase
of industrial jobs translated into greater growth of the national income.33 On
the other hand, the US economist John A. Hopkins of the Armour Research
Foundation, hired by theMinistry of Finance to evaluate the proþle of domes-
tic production, considered the þnal þgure excessive. Hopkins argued that it
was difþcult to validate the ofþcial number without a national population
30. A. DESROSIÈRES, 2004, p. 339–342.
31. MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA, 1944, p. 15.
32. BCRA, 1942, p. 15; REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 1941b, p. 17.
33. E. LLORENS, 1944; J. LOVE, 1996.
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census—the last one was taken in 1914—and without the detailed studies
of expenditure by income groups (the last one was released in 1935, with
information for 1933 and solely for the City of Buenos Aires). In addition,
he warned that beyond the fertile Pampas there were weakly monetized rural
regions, where individuals received in-kind income.34
Between 1937 and 1941 the European markets were closed to Argentine
agricultural exports. To counteract this decline in demand, livestock, com-
mercial and industrial companies expanded their participation in the protec-
ted domestic market by reinvesting their proþts in the constitution of new
productive and þnancial societies. The economists of the Central Bank and
theMinistry of Finance visualized through the estimation of national income
a comprehensive and synthetic scheme of payments and monetary transfers
in which the dynamic productive activities stood out. In their view, the next
step was to suggest a rearrangement of þscal policy. They recommended to
the Minister of Finance a mobile tax on beef exports to the United States (in
order to rescue the British pounds from the payments blocked at the Bank
of England), a tax for oil companies on their extraordinary proþts and on
the surpluses of limited companies, as well as an increase in income tax.
Associations of livestock producers, which were beneþting from the sale of
beef to the United States, ÿatly discredited the proposal of the new þscal ins-
truments.35 These policy suggestions were also undermined by the rebellious
atmosphere that emerged from the corporations of businessmen associated
in the Committee of Economic Defence (Comité de Defensa Económica).
From the headquarters of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange they marched
through the þnancial centre of Buenos Aires in protest against the excessive
weight of taxes. Their criticism extended to the increasingly drastic decisions
and announcements of the government. The Ministry of Finance justiþed
each proposed measure by saying it was inevitable, and did not provide any
margin for public debate even in Congress. The strict attitudes of the govern-
ment economists irritated different social and economic agents, to the point
that they were seen as members of a ‘þnancial dictatorship’ which had ‘the
monopoly over providing expert advice to the president on economic, indus-
trial, and technical issues connected with international trade and þnance’.36
The board of the Argentine Central Bank echoed the negative responses.
In November 1942 the board distanced itself from the statistical production
and recommendations of the OIE by claiming that the OIE reports, ‘as well
as their statements or suggestions, do not represent the opinion of the Bank
and therefore do not compromise its responsibility’.37
34. ARMOUR RESEARCH FOUNDATION, 1944, p. 30.
35. R. PREBISCH, 1944, p. 312.
36. E. J. DOSMAN, 2010, p. 167, authors’ translation.
37. BCRA, February 1945, p. 1, authors’ translation.
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The board did not jeopardize the administrative and intellectual autonomy
of the OIE, however. On the contrary, the ofþce was elevated to department
(becoming the DIE) in the middle of the coup of June 1943. Nevertheless,
the military government forced the resignation of Raúl Prebisch from the
General Management Division of the Bank. The board tried to þnd a balance
between the suggestions of the OIE economists and the complaints of the
corporate sector as well as a stance of equilibrium between the economic
conjuncture analyses and the ideas of autarchy put forward by the military.
To do this, the typed pamphlets from the DIE were not distributed among
ofþcial agencies. Moreover, on their cover and conclusion the reports warned
that ‘this report should not be partially or entirely published’.38 One of them
examined each manufacturing sector and minimized the alleged negative
impact of the resumption of imports in the post-war period, in particular
on the level of urban employment. Another report dealt with the apparent
advantage of establishing tariffs to protect metallurgical and steel activities.
Both branches were conceived as crucial to economic development under
the military doctrine of national defence.
The publication in 1946 of TheNational Income of the Argentine Republic
(La renta nacional de la República Argentina) shows the novelties of avant-
garde research conducted by an isolated research team that had no support
from the board of the Argentine Central Bank amid the triumph of the Peronist
coalition in the presidential elections of February 1946. The 1935–1945 time
series had a succinct deþnition of national income as ‘the total of goods and
services produced in the country, in a given year’.39 It presented the total
value as well as the þgures disaggregated by activity (agriculture, livestock,
mining, industry and construction, trade, and private and state services) of
the national income in current and constant pesos at 1935 prices. It contained
some conjectures and gaps about activities such as commerce and þnance
for the convulsed years 1944 and 1945. In constant values it was estimated
that the national income reached $12,720 million pesos in 1943.40 The report
lacked information on the income generated by urban and rural households,
a crucial indicator to pave the way for the welfare state.
The publication’s biases and omissions were silenced by Perón’s triumph
in the presidential elections and the series of economic and þnancial measures
taken by the new administration, which included the complete renewal of the
Central Bank’s board of directors and the nationalization of bank deposits.
José Francisco Figuerola, the technical secretary of the Presidency, published
a pamphlet in July 1946 entitled Basic Indexes of the National Economy
(Índices básicos de la economía nacional), in which he quoted the OIE
national income estimate. The publication showed absolute values and index
38. Id., May 1945, authors’ translation.
39. Id., 1946, p. 1, authors’ translation.
40. REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA, 1943, p. 41; BCRA, 1944, p. 30–31.
HM321.indb 151 31/07/2017 17:34
Page 151
Histoire & Mesure, 2017, XXXII-1
152
numbers for the period 1939–1945, based on correlations of macroeconomic
variables. One of the correlations compared the national budgets, the evolu-
tion of the national income, taxes and bank deposits.41 Figuerola’s reference
to the statistics produced by the OIE-DIE reÿects the optimism that existed
among the Peronist planners rather than the recognition of the work done
by economists and statisticians from the DGEN-OIE. Meanwhile, Prebisch
deþned Figuerola as a ‘charlatan’.42
2. An Alternative Network of Government Experts
Within the vast administrative machinery of the Argentine state another
group of experts existed. It was formed by statisticians, demographers, labour
and pro-industrialist civil servants and nationalist military men who were
located in theMinistries of Agriculture, War, Public Instruction, Interior and
Public Works. They were responsible for another set of censuses, statistics
and surveys as well as for establishing another set of rural regulations that
were gradually extended to the urban area. They conceived of certain items of
the national budget as crucial to developing medium-term public investment
programmes. Their purpose was to expand employment and accelerate the
substitution of imported goods in the midst of the Second World War and
due to the potential effects of the post-war period.
The outstanding individual and guiding thread behind the formation of this
alternative group of governmental experts was José Francisco Figuerola, head of
the Statistical Division of theNational LabourDepartment (División Estadística
del Departamento Nacional del Trabajo, DE of the DNT) between 1932
and 1943, secretary general of the Secretariat of Labour and Social Welfare
(Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social) between 1943 and 1944, secretary
general of the National Post-War Council (Consejo Nacional de Posguerra)
between 1944 and 1946, and technical secretary of the Presidency (Presidencia
de la Nación) between 1946 and 1949.With his second in command, industrial
engineer Enrique Catarineu Grau, he developed a team that produced and
analysed social and labour data. Initially, the groupwas formed by 10members
of the DE of the DNT, expanding to 65 in the National Post-War Council.43
Of Catalan origin, Figuerola specialized in corporate law and held positions
in the Spanish Ministry of Labour during the dictatorship of Miguel Primo
de Rivera. This experience made him aware of the works and doctrine of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO). This latter knowledge was crucial
in his trajectory as head of the DE of the DNT, especially in the context of
41. PRESIDENCIA DE LA NACIÓN, July 1946, p. 10.
42. E. J. DOSMAN, 2010, p. 244.
43. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014b.
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the changing relationship between the ILO and Latin American countries.44
He was a rara aviswithin the Argentine liberal culture because he referenced
John Maynard Keynes’s A Treatise on Money of 1930, Ernst Wagemann’s
Struktur und Rhythmus der Weltwirtschaft of 1931 and Maurice Halbwachs’
L’évolution des besoins dans les classes ouvrières of 1933. He highlighted
the contribution of human capital to the Argentine economy, a view closely
linked to the ideas of Social Catholics and Socialists. It is highly likely that
Prebisch’s deþnition of Figuerola as a charlatan related to the latter’s ideas
of what is nowadays understood as the social aspects of economics. Why?
Figuerola argued that the sum of wages and salaries was a crucial variable
in the circuit of production and consumption, since he understood that the
greater or lesser purchasing power of wages was a highly informative indicator
of the economic and social conjuncture.45 Moreover, Figuerola encouraged
agreements between labour unions and employer organizations through a
joint occupation regime that included the discussion of working conditions,
in which conciliation and arbitration were not a private matter but a power
of the state.46 These schemes involved the extension of collective bargaining
agreements within the productive sector, which was subject to the decline of
agricultural prices and accelerated industrialization to replace imported goods.
Figuerola’s ideaswere perfectly linked to thosemaintained by François Perroux,
a corporativist economist and precursor to development theories, who had
proven inÿuence on the ideas of Raúl Prebisch. For Perroux, the state should
balance the opposing monopolies of trade unions and capital in an industrial
economy. As a consequence, state planning would correct the distortions
produced by the market forces and thus start a new type of economy.Workers
and bosses should organize themselves into producer corporations and, thus,
class collaboration would supplant the conÿict between them.47
The unfolding of Figuerola’s skills and the transformation of his position
within the state explain the sudden gravitation of the social/welfare state
in Argentina. The team at the DE of the DNT re-elaborated the periodic
surveys on the income and expenditure of families of urban workers which
had been carried out since 1913. On the basis of the October 1933 enquiry,
it produced a cost of living index, which had been previously elaborated by
the DGEN since 1924, but had not been published since 1928.48 Figuerola
managed to include questions in the original questionnaire of the industrial
census of 1935 on employed persons, their professions or trade, their family
structure, their salaries and the duration of their working day. Using these
three sources, he offered a quantitative representation of the purchasing power
44. C. T. LANATA BRIONES, 2016, p. 154–156.
45. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014b, p. 250.
46. MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, 1943.
47. J. LOVE, 1996, p. 394.
48. For a history of the cost of living index between 1918 and 1943, see C. T. LANATA
BRIONES, 2016.
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of skilled and semi-skilled labour income in different Argentine cities. His
ofþcial tasks expanded dramatically and blurred the line that existed between
the technician, the advisor, the public interest, private affairs, the traditional
focus of urban analysis and the rural economy. Figuerola was a member of
the National Commission for Supply Control (Comisión Nacional de Control
de Abastecimientos) of theMinistry of Agriculture in 1939. This commission
was set up to monitor and regulate the prices of working-class consumer
goods. In the meetings of the committee of the commission he interacted
with the military men in charge of the requisitions and expropriations as
well as with the civil servants and technicians of the Rural Economy and
Statistics Bureau (Dirección de Economía Rural y Estadística, DERE) who
were responsible for keeping track of the commercialization chain of primary
goods. The DERE had a team as large as the one in the DGEN, but the bulk
of its members worked as informers and inspectors scattered throughout
rural areas. The DERE was the main statistical agency behind the National
Agricultural Census of 1937, which extended the representation of the rural
economy beyond the fertile Pampa region. The agency also played a big role
in the renegotiation and freezing of rural leases, which was set to counteract
the steep fall in the prices of the corn and wheat harvest.
The DE of the DNTwas in charge of preparing the tables that estimated
the pecuniary compensation of individuals injured according to the terms
of the 1940 law of occupational accidents, which extended the federal juris-
diction to agricultural–livestock farms and forest territories (Law 12,631).
Due to a request from the Ministry of the Interior, Figuerola wrote a report
on the ÿuctuations of the labour market in September 1940. In it, he distin-
guished four types of unemployment in the cities—which he named cyclical,
circumstantial, latent and partial—and warned about regional pockets of
pauperism and underconsumption. For him the solution was to expand the
existing public investment plan, with housing for workers and employees,
hospitals, schools, reservoirs, canals, airþelds, ports, and grain storage and
transportation facilities. The publication had a special chapter on ‘national
defence’ that highlighted the strategic paths of military construction building.49
The report placed him side by side with the civil servants of the Ministry of
Public Works who tried to recover 20% of the national budget to reactivate
the economy on the basis of the construction activity. Figuerola became the
representative of theMinistry of the Interior in theMinistry of PublicWorks
for a meeting which occurred in February 1941. In that gathering, Figuerola
pointed out that a synchronized order of precedence to be followed in the
projected works could absorb those individuals who were unemployed. The
minutes of the meeting took up his idea of order of precedence and used it
to propose an organic plan that rearranged the Plan of Public Works (Plan
49. MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, September 1940, p. 23–27.
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de Trabajos Públicos) within a þve-year programme of public works.50 By
then the Ministry of War had designed a multi-year plan of rearmament.
The semi-autarky imposed by the Second World War emphasized the need
to highlight the priorities of government management. The multi-annual
programmes designed by the Ministry of Public Works, on the one hand,
and the military, on the other, reÿected the existence of a consensus within
the state regarding the need to articulate public investment policy and plans
in the national budget. Undoubtedly, these initiatives in favour of increasing
spending in the medium term isolated the unilateral proposals anchored in
the search for þscal resources put forward by the economists of the Ministry
of Finance and the Central Bank. Both stances, however, avoided the power
of control of the National Congress and reÿected the technocratic spirit that
nestled within the state.
Figuerola was amember of the editorial board of the Review of Argentine
Economics. The editorial line promoted import substitution industrialization
and a state that protected human capital. A good share of its individuals
became members of the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce (Secretaría
de Industria y Comercio) between 1944 and 1948.51 Figuerola and Eduardo
Coghlan were the main men behind the Fourth Education, Illiteracy and
Housing Census of 1943. The educational character of the census resulted in
a protocol of inquiry equivalent to that followed in the Sixteenth Census of
the United States, which took place in 1940 at the time of the Second New
Deal. Thus, it was able to recognize the structure and members of household
units, their labour skills and their social ties.52A þrst questionnaire contained
the usual questions about pre-school, primary and secondary education, as
well as university training. Another form added questions on the parents or
guardians and their occupations, and the structure and conditions of housing
so as to identify possible situations of overcrowding. A question was included
concerning the situation of those mothers who had to leave the household
in order to work and the workload involved in those cases. Once the census
took place, reports were published on illiteracy, housing of the working class
and geographic distribution of the population. This data became the only
sociodemographic source available at the launch of the First Five-Year Plan,
due to the lack of updated national demographic census data. After the mili-
tary coup of June 1943, the drafts of these reports allowed the government
of General Pedro Pablo Ramírez, in place between 1943 and 1944, to create
the Rent Commission (Cámara de Alquileres) which decreed a reduction and
the freezing of existing rent contracts in order to compensate for the housing
shortage. More importantly, Figuerola gained the complete trust of Perón as
soon as the latter took ofþce as head of the DNT in October 1943. On Perón’s
50. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014a, p. 210–211.
51. C. BELINI, 2006, p. 27–50.
52. H. GONZÁLEZ BOLLO, 2014a, p. 188.
HM321.indb 155 31/07/2017 17:34
Page 155
Histoire & Mesure, 2017, XXXII-1
156
þrst visit to the DNT, he spent a great number of hours with Figuerola reviewing
the statistics collected and the reports produced by the DE.53 From then on,
Figuerola and Perón developed a strong bond, despite the former being þred
from his post as technical secretary of the Presidency not long after Perón
became president. The relationship continued, however. When Figuerola died
in September 1970, Perón sent a letter to his widow giving his condolences
for the death of his ‘endearing companion and friend’.54
From this, it is clear that Figuerola developed an inductive view of the
Argentine economy, based on surveys, censuses and statistics that highlighted
the needs of the working class rather than being based on deductions from
large monetary aggregates, which was the approach of the technicians from
the OIE-DIE. Figuerola had ameritorious progression within the public sector
in which he accumulated bureaucratic capital, thanks to the multiple answers
he gave and the detailed knowledge he acquired of the regulations in force.
He also had direct and privileged contact with Perón. His civilian andmilitary
interlocutors expanded his contact and reconnaissance networks. Together they
developed a speciþc view of anArgentine economy and its socio-labour agents
living in a post-war period subject to scarcity of resources. Figuerola and his
interlocutors shared the concern of setting a productive proþle for Argentina
using the economic, þnancial, human and technical resources of the expanded
administration.Multi-year plans were the key to reconciling autarchy, national
defence, growth, income redistribution and development.
Conclusion
Initially, the Five-Year Plan was run by three individuals positioned in
three different government agencies. The Technical Secretariat—in charge
of the ‘study, management and supervision of the implementation’55 of the
plan—converged with theMinistry of Finance.While Figuerola, the technical
secretary, highlighted the coordinating role of the national budget for production
and consumption during the war years,56 Finance Minister Ramón Antonio
Cereijo advocated a ‘modern þscal policy’ to expand the Argentine economy
and reduce its vulnerability.57 Figuerola was the executive branch’s point of
liaison with ministers and secretaries and was responsible for the planning,
coordination and execution of þnancial, economic and social issues, except
those related to national defence. Cereijo provided the doctrinaire arguments
of the plan based on authors like Karl Mannheim and Alvin Hansen. Lastly,
53. See C. FAYT, 1967, p. 97.
54. Letter sent by Perón to Figuerola’s widow, reproduced in J. DELGADO, 1992, p. 432,
authors’ translation.
55. ‘Para la ejecución del Plan del P. E. diéronse normas’, 1946, authors’ translation.
56. PRESIDENCIA DE LA NACIÓN, July 1946, p. 9–10, 17.
57. R. A. CEREIJO, 1947.
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Miguel Miranda—member of the Argentine Central Bank and in charge of
the Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade (Instituto Argentino para
la Promoción del Intercambio)—transferred the funds directly from the
treasury of the Argentine Central Bank, since his attempts to buy cheaply
from local agricultural producers and sell at higher prices abroad did not
materialize.58 $6,990 million pesos were assigned to the plan. The amount
was broken down into þve speciþc allocations: public works; a so-called
National Energy Plan; public health; immigration and colonization; and the
promotion of sea þshing and domestic industry. From the þnancial point of
view, the First Five-Year Plan should be considered a capital budget aimed
at expanding the infrastructure of public services and strengthening the state
presence in the construction of citizenship, to emphasize social rights, perhaps
as a precondition for the process of industrialization.59
This paper has examined the divergence between the inaugural Argentine
national accounts estimates and the First Five-Year Plan. Such a speciþc
trajectory was grounded in the existence of two different teams of experts
that were formed within the Argentine state in the 1930s and 1940s. Each
group had its own vision of the national economy, based on its speciþc use
of statistics.
For many years, the team at the OIE-DIE in association with the DGEN
provided the Argentine government with a toolbox of statistics and reports,
including two national accounts estimates. Both estimates were cognitive
innovations, a product of a remarkable concentration of technical and human
resources that adopted and adapted statistical tools developed elsewhere by
similar institutions. On the basis of this information, the agency generated a
detailed analysis of the þscal sources and resources available with the aim to
enhance the state’s incomes. Thus, the OIE-DIE had a view that highlighted
the þscal aspects and needs of the nation. Due to the political dynamic, the
ideas, reports and recommendations of the OIE-DIE were discredited by
several sectors. The Argentine Central Bank distanced itself from the statistical
production and recommendations of the OIE-DIE and þred Raúl Prebisch,
the statistical agency’s mentor, from its board. This undermined the statistical
production of the OIE-DIE. Consequently, this impacted on the later (lack of)
use of the national accounts when developing the Five-Year Plan.
The 1943 coup d’état and the formation of a coalition between army
ofþcers, state managers and pro-industry economists fostered technocratic
decision-making, enhancing the role of national defence. Figuerola, who was
the head of the second group of statistical experts that formed within the
Argentine state, had a crucial role in this process. The plan was conceived
as a shock of public investment in infrastructure to give impetus to different
58. J. FODOR, 1975; J. V. SOURROUILLE & A. H. RAMOS, 2013.
59. B. HERRICK, 1967, p. 357.
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activities, starting from the very foundations of the economy. This put the
þscal aspects that worried the OIE-DIE team on a completely different level.
Thus, this paper also shows that the absence of utilization of the national
account estimates was also related to the particular objectives of the First
Five-Year Plan.
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